bright bang

A Fallacy of Cosmic Proportions – the Kalam Cosmological Argument

A further response to Gary Robertson’s Is naturalism more probable than supernaturalism? which was a rejoinder to Naturalism vs Supernaturalism – the False Dichotomy

 

Most contemporary philosophers regard the cosmological argument as unconvincing. Despite the best efforts of William Lane Craig, the famous argument never recovered from the assault it took at the hands of David Hume and Immanuel Kant. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, even noted theologian, Alvin Plantinga concludes “that this piece of natural theology is ineffective”. Other philosophers similarly reject the argument: Michael Martin (1990: chap. 4), John Mackie (1982: chap. 5), Quentin Smith (Craig and Smith 1993), Bede Rundle (2004), Wes Morriston (2000, 2002, 2003, 2010), and Graham Oppy (2006: chap. 3).

To hang one’s metaphysical hat on the cosmological argument is to watch it sail away on the breeze.

William Lane Craig’s recent form of the Kalam Cosmological argument:

  1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
  2. The Universe began to exist.
  3. Therefore, the Universe had a cause.
William Lane Craig

William Lane Craig

Gary Robertson disagrees the KCA invokes the fallacy of composition by applying the same principle of causality which applies to the universe’s constituent parts, to the universe as a whole. Citing philosopher Edward Feser, who unconvincingly asserts that “it is hard to see how” things which are individually contingent are no less contingent when part of a group, the objection conveniently ignores what is so special about the mystery of existence.

The universe is not merely just an assortment of planets and stars. The riddle of existence, “Why is there something rather than nothing?”, would not be a riddle if it could be so simply answered, “it must have been caused!”. The riddle is founded upon Parmenides famous statement – “from nothing, nothing comes”. So, when musing about the answer to existence itself, the question becomes perspicuously different. We are now talking about the origin of existence itself, and why does it exist instead of nothing at all, and how and whether it arises from nothing.

Further, the powerful and interacting forces of nature, such as the pulling and repulsing of gravity, which determine the complex relations between physical things within the universe, tells us emphatically that reality is more than just a hamper full of stuff. The universe is not a glass menagerie, nor is it a bag of mixed lollies.

We could further speculate on the origin of the principle of causality. One assumes that the theist would say it was part of God’s creation. Viz. not an eternal principle. Thus, it’s circular and self-referential to invoke the causal principle to explain the existence of the universe of which it is a part.

And so, for the aforementioned reasons, it is indeed a fallacy of composition to assume that what is true of causality in the universe applies to the universe itself.

Gary Robertson disputes my objection to premise 1 of the KCA, that the universe had a beginning, by claiming the consensus of physicists and cosmologists agree the universe had a beginning. This may well be true, but I could more powerfully argue that a larger consensus of physicists and cosmologists reject a supernatural cause of the universe. As stated, a consensus of philosophers rejects the KCA! A consensus, being a survey of opinions, does not prove anything. Thus, the challenge to premise 1 remains.

Gary claims a brute fact, in the sense of an eternal force governing all of nature, can be ruled out, because it would have to exist before the Big Bang and be either timeless or self-caused. Thus, it would either transcend or sit outside of nature. But this objection only suggests such a force would sit outside of Gary’s rather narrow view of “nature” – which evidently constitutes the known universe from the time of the Big Bang.

Even on Gary’s definition this does not preclude a “supernatural” force. But if we did discover such a force, or identify it through evidence gathered in the material world, it’s only a matter of semantics as to whether we would name it as natural or supernatural. Thus, it’s a reification fallacy, given that human definitions have no bearing on what actually exists in the universe. Further, scientists consider the prospect of multiverses to be eminently possible, but none posits these as supernatural, as they would be under Gary’s definition.

 

Brute Facts and Necessary Beings

nexessary being

The denial of God as a brute fact highlights the special pleading required to insert God as a necessary cause. Gary Robertson cites Broussard (2016) who exempts God from being an unexplained brute fact, because his existence is explained by his essence. It seems childish and unnecessary to point out how circular this argument is – how can the essence of a hypothetical, unverified being ever be established – not to mention how it might be used in favour of any potential being, thing or force.

From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the Cosmological Argument:

“If theists are willing to accept the existence of God as the necessary being as a brute fact, why cannot nontheists accept the existence of the universe as a brute fact, as a necessary being? Bede Rundle, for example, argues that what has necessary existence is causally independent. Matter has necessary existence, for although it undergoes change as manifested in particular bits of matter, the given volume of matter found in the universe persists, and as persisting matter/energy does not have or need a cause. This accords with the Principle of Conservation of Mass-Energy, according to which matter and energy are never lost but rather transmute into each other. As indestructible, matter/energy is the necessary being. Consequently, although the material components of the universe are contingent vis-à-vis their form, they are necessary vis-à-vis their existence. On this reading, there is not one but there are many necessary beings, all internal to the universe. Their particular configurations are contingent, but since matter/energy is conserved it cannot be created or lost.”

The theist argues that the existence of the universe points to a necessary being – since all contingent things look to something else for their existence. Thus, the creator is a necessary being.

But the theist also maintains that the universe at some point did not exist, and in fact, was created from nothing by the necessary being. This indicates that the description of a creator as a necessary being is contingent on his own decision to create a universe, in such, that if the universe did not exist there could be no necessary being. Since the universe could have failed to exist by the theists own argument, then the concept of a necessary being becomes self-defeating.

hume's necessary being

Finally, even if we accepted the Cosmological argument, it still doesn’t get us to God. If we accepted the logic that everything has a cause, this does not demonstrate a cause which is “supernatural”, or some kind of deity.

The further arguments B and C presented to purportedly deduce the nature of a cause are silly arguments. For instance:

“B. It is logically impossible to provide a natural explanation for how nature came into existence as such an explanation must assume the existence of nature in its opening premises, thus committing the circular fallacy.”

No, it may mean that nature contains another element which is as yet unobserved. Or even an existing element of nature which has the, as yet unrecognised, property of seeding the universe. Further, a brute fact is a candidate because, by definition, it has no explanation.

The theist is all too keen to fill any uncertainty with supernatural explanations. As per my previous post, it will not be philosophers who solve the riddle of the universe’s origin. It will not happen by using logic. The secrets of nature have been gradually revealed using the scientific method. Cosmologists, astrophysicists and many other scientists continue to search the universe for answers. It is now time to dispense with the semantic trickery of the cosmological argument and indeed the other discredited logical arguments, and look to Hadron colliders, telescopes and space probes for the answer.

nochurch religion

Australia’s Census Result Heralds a Religion-neutral Secular Shift

As published in Areo Magazine Australia’s Census Result Heralds a Secular Shift – 29 June 2017

The surge in “No religion” in the 2016 Census heralds a more secular Australia. With a rise from 22.3% in 2011 to 30.1% in 2016, “No Religion” has overtaken Catholicism to become the most popular belief category.

Mirroring the trend in similar western countries, Australia has been losing its religion over a long period — Christianity has fallen from 88% in 1966 to 52.1% in 2016. Given one third of Australians are now nonbelievers, and Christianity has fallen to below 50% in six out of eight states, we are now without a dominant belief system.

But “secular” is not synonymous with non-belief. The impetus for a more secular society results from acknowledging the end of Christian hegemony, and in recognizing our increased cultural diversity and religious pluralism. “Secular” means the separation of church and state. Specifically, our Constitution’s Section 116 precludes the Federal government from making “any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion…”

The religious neutral approach of our founding fathers was influenced by the “establishment” clause in the US Constitution, which reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” But while the establishment clause has been applied strictly by the US courts, the similar words contained in Section 116 only apply to the Federal government, and have been interpreted so narrowly that no court has ever found any law to be in contravention of Section 116.

establishment clause

And so, our increasing pluralism, as evidenced by the Census result, provide a strong impetus to embrace a more robust understanding of secularism. There’s no reason why we shouldn’t emulate the United States in disallowing school prayers and prohibiting teachers from preaching religion. Similarly, Christian prayers have no place in opening Parliament.

Similarly, those in receipt of taxpayer funds, should not have the power to discriminate on the basis of faith. Thus, the blanket exemptions from anti-discrimination law which exist for tax payer funded religious institutions, including private schools, must be reconsidered.

But it’s more than this. Realizing a truly secular state requires a belief-neutral and evidence-based approach to policymaking. Specifically, policy must not become beholden to the religious views of individuals or religious lobby groups. Again and again we see the same old stalemate; as issues such as same sex marriage, abortion, and euthanasia, are stymied by the “religious convictions” of a few: as if religiosity grants them a sacred power of veto.

But an equitable and fair minded approach should not extend to banishing faith from the public square. Crucially, the distinction is between state-sponsored religious favoritism, and the secular freedom to discuss the tenets and values embedded in religious or nonreligious beliefs.

Indeed, a secular approach embraces the understanding of religious freedom outlined by Article 18 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, which protects the freedom to express any thought or belief, religious or otherwise.

Thus, religious beliefs continue to form a key part of our political discourse. Policies can be justified based on the tenets of religion, as long as they do not compel religious belief or worship. For example, the opponents of same sex marriage would continue to enjoy complete freedom to express their views in terms of a biblical view of marriage. Equally, the champions of policy change in abortion could express their views in whatever religious or nonreligious context they see fit.    

A neutral approach does not equate to saying that belief is only a personal matter, and that religion has no place in politics. Secularism is, after all, a tool for liberty, not a restriction on our freedoms. Free expression of all beliefs is the defining element of the secular state, and must be vouchsafed.

In that respect, a secular country is distinguished from an irreligious one. The “wall of separation” provided by the US establishment clause was built and fortified by Protestant versus Catholic enmities. Thus, the oft-repeated pejorative terms of “aggressive” or “radical” secularism, misunderstands the concept. Secularism is about fairness, not unbelief. A more robust form of secularism is evinced in the level playing field — maximizing freedom, and minimizing privilege.

JFK secularism

Thus, secularism cannot be weaponized by the nonbeliever: those who want to wield the “secular” hammer misunderstands it’s meaning. Secularism is not, as is often erroneously asserted, a separate set of irreligious values competing with Christianity in a zero sum game. We do not lose the values which underpin our society, and which are an amalgam of all of our various traditions and evolutionary history, stretching back and beyond the Athenian democracy of the 5th century B.C. We do not discard the values of Christianity; just as, we do not junk our democratic values, including the principle of government by the people and for the people.  Secularism simply means that the state cannot promote or dictate particular beliefs systems in preference to others. 

The 2016 Census result shows a significant shift away from Christianity as our dominant belief system, suggesting a shift toward a more secular society. In the long term, a religion-neutral approach would have the dual benefit of levelling the playing field, as well as protecting the rights of individuals and groups to hold and practice an increasingly diverse set of belief systems.

church and state

The Powerful New Force: Australian Politics And Media Should Reflect The Fact That Non-Belief Is On The Rise

As published in the Huffpost Australia – Australian Politics And Media Should Reflect The Fact That Non-Belief Is On The Rise – 28 June 2017

 

abc church and state

Take note, Australia: More Australians recorded “No religion” in the 2016 Census than any other individual religion or denomination. Surging from 22.3 percent in 2011 to 30.1 percent, non-belief has overtaken Catholicism, which fell from 25.3 percent to 22.6 percent.

Take note, politicians: Observe the irreligious voting block comprising nearly one third of all Australians — a figure comparable to the the 34.9 percent that the ALP polled in the 2016 Federal election. Thus, nonbelievers represent a powerful, new force in politics.

Take note, media: The large non-believing demographic demands a voice. Secular groups and activists are rarely seen on television or radio, even on issues featuring the intersection of religious belief and politics.

Recall the ABC’s ‘Q&A’ special episode on Church and State in April 2016? The topic was secularism, but the panel featured not one secularist. The panel were exclusively Christian, featuring Christian pastors, academics and, of course, the Australian Christian Lobby.

acb christian church and state

Our public broadcaster features numerous religious programs, but none specifically dedicated to discussing non-belief. These programs include ‘Compass’, ‘For the God Who Sings’, ‘Religion & Ethics Report’, ‘Songs of Praise’, the ‘Spirit of Things’, and ‘God Forbid’.

Despite a veritable baptism of religious programmes, the scrapping of the 15-year-old Sunday Nights necessitated crisis talks with Catholic priest, Father Frank Brennan, Baptist minister Tim Costello, and Reverend Elenie Poulos, of the Uniting Church. All this, even though a new half-hour program, ‘Religion and Ethics’, was added to Radio National.

Jesus wept. I don’t have a problem with religious shows, but surely the secular viewpoint deserves a run also. Further, overlooking one third of taxpayers, altogether runs against the ABC’s policy of presenting a diversity of views.

ABC’s online Religion and Ethics, makes a pretence of catering for the secular voice, but only rarely is a rationalist or secular view represented. By and large, the site features religious commentary by local and international academics and apologists. Tellingly, the public comments facility has been disabled and old comments deleted. One suspects, perhaps uncharitably, that it is due to their overwhelmingly negative character.

The diversity of secular views has been, until now, nearly invisible in the Australian media. But, it contains particular value. Focussing on rational thought and empirical evidence would be a breath of fresh air, in a climate of fake news, zingers, and Left versus Right ideological warfare.

In the UK, secular voices such as Richard Dawkins, Stephen Fry, and AC Grayling appear regularly on panel shows. In the US, Bill Maher fosters are irreverent take on politics, and a variety of nonreligious authors and thinkers including Sam Harris, Stephen Pinker, Daniel Dennett, Lawrence Krauss and Stephen Hawking contribute to debate. Additionally, many of the well-known Australians with secular views such as Peter Singer, Geoffrey Robertson, Clive James, and Tim Minchin, are based overseas.

The lack of secular voices in the media perpetuates Christian privilege. Declining religiosity hasn’t lessened the influence of the increasingly unrepresentative lobby groups claiming to speak for mainstream Australians. One key issue is the decline in observance and belief among the religious. A 2012 McCrindle survey showed a third of those identifying as Christian were “more spiritual than Christian”.

Empty churches sit idle on street corners, while in Canberra, Christian lobbyists perpetuate the transfer of religious observance from churches into secular state schools. Schools teaching religion as a comparative subject are the norm in most similarly irreligious countries, such as Finland, UK, New Zealand — some of which have zoomed past us in the international PISA rankings.

While fewer people believe all the tenets of scripture, the religious hierarchy successfully pressures politicians to maintain a biblical view of marriage, to oppose assisted dying, and to continue to over-subsidize Catholic schools.

For many, marking ‘Christian’ represents little more than a cultural affiliation. Emphasizing the nominal nature of their belief, is the fact that a majority of Christians support for same sex marriage, and that 70 percent of Catholics and Anglicans support assisted dying. Of those who support the latter, 84 percent are non-observant. But of those Christians opposing euthanasia, 92 percent are “true believers”: that is, prayerful, church goers. These represent a vanishing minority of Australians, given a mere 8 percent still attend church regularly.

It’s high time politicians abandoned the fallacy that religious outrage is a vote changer. For the vanishing few true believers who swap their vote, there exists an order-of-magnitude-larger group of nonbelievers to cancel them out.

The increase in non-belief marks a seismic shift in our belief landscape. So, it’s about time the voices of the godless were heard in the corridors of Canberra, and their faces became more recognisable in the mainstream media.

nation of nonbelievers

The Census surge in non-belief heralds a new secularism

 
Census surge heralds a secular state – The Courier Mail 28 June 2017

MORE Australians ticked “No religion” in the 2016 Census than any other belief category. The results, released yesterday, show non-belief surging from 22.3 per cent in 2011 to 30.1, overtaking Catholicism which fell from 25.3 per cent to 22.6.

The change represents a watershed. The number of Christians has fallen from 88 per cent in 1966 to 52.1 per cent in 2016; a free fall which looks set to continue given 39 per cent of adults aged 18-34 now report no religion.

nation of nonbelievers

Christian dominance is ending and, marking a seismic shift in our belief landscape, nearly one third of Australians are now nonbelievers.

The effect should be wide ranging: a new voting block of nonbelievers surely forces us to consider bolstering our rather weak version of secularism.

Providing further impetus to consider this change is the fact that a fading religious belief runs deeper than just the rise in nonbelievers. Many of those marking “Christian” on the Census are expressing a “cultural” preference rather than genuine religious belief.

A 2012 McCrindle survey reported one third of Christians were more spiritual than religious.

In that respect, Australian data on Christian religious observance mirrors that of other western countries such as the UK, Ireland and the Scandinavian countries. Less than 10% of us attend church regularly, and the majority of weddings and funerals are now secular events. Caring more about everyday matters, mainstream Christians are mostly nominal, and unobservant.

Driven by our sharp decline in religiosity, we can expect to see our type of secularism become more robust, and more determinedly belief-neutral. In contrast to the US, which has enforced the Establishment Clause strictly, our Constitution’s Section 116 has always been interpreted narrowly (it doesn’t even apply to the states!), allowing a blurry and uneasy relationship between religion and governance.

Which explains how we allow prayers in parliament, along with Christian chaplains and faith-based religious instruction in secular state schools. Bizarrely, blasphemy is still a crime in most states of Australia. The lip service paid to secularism stands, sits uncomfortably with our decreasing piety.

Symptomatic of this decline, parents are increasingly opting their children out of faith-taught religious classes in NSW and QLD state schools. And in Victoria, religious classes were scrapped from curriculum time, in 2015, to allow more focus on core learning.

A new understanding of secularism resists the privileging of specific belief systems in the public domain. As the handmaiden of democracy, secularism insists that Abraham Lincoln’s democratic principle of government “of the people, by the people, and for the people”, remains pure and undiluted by prioritising the beliefs of one group over another.

A notable disparity exists when taxpayer-funded and tax-free faith groups enjoy blanket exemptions from anti-discrimination laws. So, the taxes of some nonbelievers subsidise groups who actively and legally discriminate against them.

Rising non-belief shines a light on certain areas of public policy where the lobbying of Archbishops and religious groups continue to stonewall progress. Why, for instance, is same sex marriage still not legal? Why is there such a deference to minority views, favouring religious convictions over nonreligious convictions, that the parliament fails to enact popular opinion?

Similarly, consider euthanasia: 75% of Australians support assisted dying and of those who object, 92% have religious connections.

Why does abortion remain technically illegal in NSW and QLD? Providing a safe and legal option for women to terminate unwanted pregnancies is supported by 80% of our populace.

Advancing religion remains a tax free charitable purpose, under laws dating back to the 1600’s, despite a 2016 IPSOS poll showing less than 20% of Australians support the measure. In the same poll, 55% of respondents answered that religion had no public benefit.

2016 census

Necessarily, the freefall in Christianity increases Australia’s diversity of beliefs, emphasizing our pluralism. Each year there are fewer of our fellow citizens who think religious freedom means the right to impose their beliefs on others. Most Australians would agree with the version of religious freedom expressed by article 18 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, which protects theistic, nontheistic, and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right to profess any religion or belief.

From this zeitgeist emerges a New Secularism. Underpinned by overwhelming popular support – 75% of Australians support the separation of church and state – the move towards secularism becomes inexorable now that non-belief joins the mainstream. Non-belief is the new normal. The bright light of secularism will guide us away from Christian hegemony, and towards a fairer, more inclusive, state-neutral approach to matters of belief.

religious chart info

bell ringer electorcutions

Naturalism remains undefeated: an answer to Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism

Naturalism remains undefeated – a rejoinder to the Alvin Plantinga argument used in Post 3 that naturalism is self-defeating. Post 5.

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lightning church

Popularizing the claim that naturalism and evolution are mutually self-defeating, Alvin Plantinga argues in the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (1993), that, given unguided evolution, our beliefs have no intrinsic relation to the truth.

Drawing on previous arguments made by C.S. Lewis and Arthur Balfour, Plantinga claims that if humans are the product of undirected processes, then we cannot reasonably rely on what we perceive. In fact, it’s just “as likely …that we live in a sort of dream world as that we actually know something about ourselves and our world.”

Thus, if we cannot rely on our beliefs, then we cannot rely on our belief in naturalism and thus, naturalism is defeated.

Well, it would be very worrying if we couldn’t rely on any of our beliefs. But evidently, humans have good reason to rely on their cognition, and we do so in myriad situations daily.

We also have no reason to distrust the accepted science of evolution and the various mechanisms which operate within it; such as the mutation of genes, natural selection, and genetic drift.

Given there is no reason to discount both our cognitive capacities and the science of evolution, then the argument becomes problematic. Another way of expressing Plantinga’s argument is that we should distrust our knowledge of evolution based on our knowledge of evolution. Nonsense.

Second, even if we somehow accepted the unreliability of our beliefs, this would mean only that we could not rely on our belief in naturalism; not that naturalism is untrue. But, nor could we rely on our cognition that it is false. Therefore, if true, the unreliability-of-beliefs premise is either self-defeating for beliefs in naturalism and theism, or not self-defeating for both. Thus, it gets us precisely nowhere.

Third, the argument presumes that theism somehow provides humans with reliable cognition.

Plantinga explains,

“God has created us in his image, and an important part of our image bearing is our resembling him in being able to form true beliefs and achieve knowledge”.

But, inserting a supernatural element (God) as a fact, is a circular argument. Viz. if God exists, naturalism must be untrue, so there’s no use invoking God as evidence that naturalism is untrue. (Prove God exists first!).

Further, the Philosopher William Ramsay has observed how human faculties are, in fact, slightly unreliable – look at our impressive array of cognitive biases! Ramsay further posits that evolution and naturalism explain this better than theism. In fact, the well-established foibles in our thinking pose a considerable challenge to Plantinga’s suggestion that we are the perfect perceivers of truth one would expect as the product of an omnipotent Creator.

Plantinga’s argument trades upon the philosophical knowledge-problem: the difficulty in providing a neat solution to the foundation of knowledge: how do we know we can rely on our beliefs? But this philosophical problem is not specific to either evolution of naturalism: the challenge pertains to all of our beliefs.

In fact, our evolution by natural selection justifies a moderate level of trust in our cognitive faculties. The brain size of the various human species has increased from 400cc to 1350cc over several millions of years. In this time, archaic humans developed more sophisticated stone tools, harnessed fire, developed language, and began to use symbolic thought. Natural selection seems to have been effective in providing reproductive advantage by selecting for those traits. Claiming this is “accidental” misunderstands natural selection. Increases in brain size and thinking ability, are selection effects we could expect to correlate to accurate perceptions about reality. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how we could have survived as a species if our perceptions and beliefs have no relation to the real world.

Nevertheless, Plantinga draws strength from a quote of Darwin expressing worry about the veracity of evolved human thought.

“But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?”

— Charles Darwin, to William Graham 3 July 1881

One can only wonder whether Darwin would have revised his doubts had he been able to witness the magnificent confirmation of his theory of natural selection via subsequent discoveries in the fossil record, and the field of genetics.

Natural selection has become the cornerstone of modern biology. There is no longer any doubt about the fact of our unguided evolution from prior species, and our connection to other forms of life.

Indeed, the yearning to understand our world has been a feature in the development of humans. When we observed natural events that we could not explain, we posited underlying causes. Recall, hunter gatherers performing rain dances, ancient tribes sacrificing animals and children. Up until the last 500 years, theology posited supernatural causes for most unexplained phenomena. In the 18th century hundreds of church bell ringers were electrocuted, as they tried to ward off the devils who cast lightning upon the earth.

To the current day, science and religion offer competing views of how to understand the world. Science uses the scientific method which relies on hypothesis, testing and prediction, and is always subject to revision. Theologians will always seek to explain mysteries by inserting supernatural elements such as ghosts and deities.

But science has uncovered other invisible, underlying causes of natural events. These include things like electromagnetism, gravity, and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Needless to say, none of these could be arrived at through intuition alone. The gradual accumulation of scientific knowledge, where the work of one scientist enabled another, has helped humans to understand physical forces which are deeply counterintuitive; even, seemingly incomprehensible. Think of how light behaves as a wave and a particle at the same time; how particles can seemingly exist in multiple places at the same time; of how the universe is only 5% matter, the rest being made of dark matter and dark energy.

The invisible forces have been discovered and thus, we no longer need supernaturalism. We have no need to postulate other undefined and unverifiable forces. We certainly have no reason to entertain the idea that the discoveries of science are vulnerable to a superimposed truth-giving deity. Plantinga’s argument is but a rationalization allowing theists to question evolution and naturalism. But it relies on doubting accepted science, and inserting a supernatural element, and thus, is itself, self-defeating.

molecules

Weak naturalism places the burden of proof on the supernaturalist

Post 4. Rejoinder to Gary Robertson. Gary has provided a detailed response to my second post in our written debate. Given its length, I will respond to the key arguments as follows:

  1. Weak naturalism places the burden of proof on the supernaturalist
  2. Philosophical naturalism is not self-defeating
  3. Kalam Cosmological Argument

 

Weak naturalism places the burden of proof on the supernaturalist

As far as we know, the natural world is all there is. By weakening naturalism to a belief held in the absence of evidence to the contrary, weak naturalism becomes an even more formidable opponent to supernaturalism.

Weak naturalism is analogous to “weak” atheism. A weak atheist simply disbelieves in God given the lack of evidence. Weak naturalism disavows the supernatural for the same reason.

Without relying on the accepted definitions of naturalism (ie. philosophical naturalism, methodological naturalism), or of the rich philosophical history, weak naturalism is justifiable on its own terms. In only asserting the existence of the natural world, and by leaving itself open to disproof by evidence of a supernatural realm, the burden of proof is transferred to the “supernaturalist”.

Proposing weak naturalism, does not entail “appealing to the fact that nature exists rather than providing any positive evidence showing why it’s probable nothing transcends nature”. Rather, it appeals to the lack of evidence for anything supernatural, period.

Further, we might wonder what “positive evidence” could be provided for things which don’t actually exist? Things like ghosts, Big foot, or Atlantis. Surely, the lack of any evidence for said things amounts to at least a prima facie case for their nonexistence. Further, our default position should be that they don’t exist, rather than they do exist.

Now therefore, it’s up to the supernaturalist to provide evidence of the existence of a supernatural world. Where is Exhibit A? Unfortunately, the claims of the supernaturalist fall at the first hurdle.

Indeed, we should observe the special pleading routinely used to justify beliefs held sans evidence. The supernatural is defended by proposing methods of enquiry beyond the scope of empirical science. Since the supernatural is defined as being beyond the scope of the natural world, not governed by natural laws, and not measurable by science, the supernaturalist posits other means of evidence.

But this is an illegitimate move, which justifies any belief whatsoever. If this was acceptable, we would only need to claim a proposition is beyond the purview of science, and, “Voila!” we can demand equal epistemic justification for fairies, unicorns and the Loch Ness Monster. We can also keep superimposing new unseen layers upon the universe.

Further, it’s not entirely clear what this “evidence” is. In fact, it’s a circular argument seeking to justify the supernatural by inventing its own special realm of supernatural evidence. If such a realm is beyond the limits of empiricism, then it is unknowable by nature, and thus, by definition, lacks any epistemic likelihood.

We also see the appeal to immaterial realities, such as appreciation of poetry, literature, music and such, as if to suggest that these are evidence. As if things which cannot be seen, or which are not explainable by science, point to the possibility of a supernatural cloak upon reality. But we may briskly walk from the science lab over to the humanities building and see books of poetry. We can play musical instruments, read music, and even use an MRI machine to view our neurons firing as we listen. Our invisible thoughts constitute no more evidence of supernaturalism, than does the invisible operation of gravity.

Alternatively, supernaturalists seek to frame the debate in a philosophical, rather than scientific manner. In this way, the hard evidence of science can be replaced with philosophical argument: a softer approach which is satisfied by a lesser threshold for evidence.

Imagine this: We have found an incontrovertible answer to the existence of the universe. Would you be surprised if this was discovered by a team of Cosmologists? Or, theoretical physicists? Probably not.

But what if it the announcement mentioned a team of philosophers? The reason such an announcement would be greeted with derision, is that we know that without evidence, testing and verification, a claim made purely on philosophical grounds is lacking. A discovery of this type would only find general acceptance by scientific confirmation. Further, we know that it’s scientists who are working on these questions, not philosophers. They are questions of fact, not argument.

Thus, it’s not scientism to expect knowledge-claims to be verifiable, or testable. The scientific method has become the accepted method of inquiry.

Using philosophical argument, theists sometimes invoke Aquinas Five Ways or the cosmological argument to claim the universe must have had a cause, as though this was evidence. But alas, the cosmological argument is not accepted as empirical knowledge. In fact, the majority of current philosophers remain unpersuaded. Nor does the existence of the world count as “using evidence”, when invoked as a premise used to draw an illegitimate conclusion.

Weak naturalism limits itself to what we know. If there are realms which we cannot know, then there is no use in speculating upon them. The question of evidence becomes the key issue. If evidence is not measurable and knowable then it is not really evidence. And in the absence of useful evidence, it’s a false dichotomy to suggest that weak naturalism is equally likely to supernaturalism.

 

science versus religion

Is naturalism more probable than supernaturalism?

 

Post 3 Gary Robertson replies to Hugh Harris based on the essay : Naturalism vs Supernaturalism – the False Dichotomy

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by Gary Robertson

Gary works in the media monitoring industry.

 

Hugh Harris defends a version of philosophical naturalism that contends it is likely nothing exists outside of the natural world. Hugh primarily bases his defence on “the observance of the natural world along with its laws”, which essentially consists of him appealing to the fact that nature exists rather than providing any positive evidence showing why it’s probable nothing transcends nature. Yet the question being addressed in this debate is not ‘Does the natural world exist?’, but ‘Is there a reality beyond the natural world?’

Hugh’s defence of weak naturalism is also based on what he perceives as “the absence of any evidence of the supernatural” and here his case largely consists of negative arguments in which rebuttals are presented against arguments for the existence of a supernatural reality. Before I respond to Hugh’s comments and counterarguments relating to my first post, “Is Naturalism more probable than Supernaturalism?”, I would like to discuss some serious shortcomings of the metaphysical position he defends.

Naturalism and Human Reason

Various forms of the ‘evolutionary argument against naturalism’ by philosophers Alvin Plantinga, Thomas Nagel, CS Lewis and others show philosophical naturalism (both reductive and nonreductive) to be incompatible with reason and that, therefore, believing in philosophical naturalism is self-defeating. Philosopher of science Bruce Gordon explains the argument as follows:

“The prospect of human knowledge depends upon the veridicality of our perceptions and the validity of our reasoning processes. If the certainty resulting from cognitive perception and valid inference provides a genuine grasp of how reality must be independent of our minds, then knowledge is possible, but if the certainty so obtained is a mere feeling and not a genuinely reliable insight into reality, then we do not have knowledge. Now, if naturalism is true, human beings came about as the result of undirected processes of evolution that had no goal in mind. In such case, our cognitive faculties are the end result of mindless causes and historical accidents that take no account of truth or logic, just the exigencies of survival. Under such conditions, any complex of beliefs and desires that conduces to survival would suffice. What we believe to be true under such conditions is therefore an accidental historical byproduct of purely natural events that bear no intrinsic relation to the actual truth of the beliefs we hold; it is an expression of how our brains just happen to work. That our beliefs should actually be true under such conditions seems quite unlikely; at the very least, whether our beliefs are true or false cannot be ascertained. If naturalism is true, therefore, our reasoning processes are so discredited that they cannot support the truth of any of the beliefs we happen to hold, especially those rather distant from immediate experience, such as the belief in naturalism itself. Belief in naturalism is therefore epistemically self-defeating, and since there is for the naturalist no remedy to this situation, it is irrational to be a philosophical naturalist because it destroys the possibility of rationality altogether.” (Gordon, 2011)

Charles Darwin himself inadvertently acknowledged that the unreliability of human cognition was intrinsic to his theory of evolution by natural selection. For instance, in a private letter written in 1881 he stated:

“Nevertheless you have expressed my inward conviction, though far more vividly and clearly than I could have done, that the Universe is not the result of chance. But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind of lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?”(Darwin, 1881)

In an earlier letter Darwin wrote:

“Another source of conviction in the existence of God, connected with the reason and not with the feelings, impresses me as having much more weight. This follows from the extreme difficulty or rather impossibility of conceiving this immense and wonderful universe, including man with his capacity of looking far backwards and far into futurity, as the result of blind chance or necessity. When thus reflecting I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to man; and I deserve to be called a Theist. This conclusion was strong in my mind about the time, as far as I can remember, when I wrote the ‘Origin of Species;’ and it is since that time that it has very gradually, with many fluctuations, become weaker. But then arises the doubt, can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions?” (Barlow, 1958)

Unfortunately Darwin acknowledged this inherent aspect of his theory very selectively. As the above quotes indicate he only deemed his beliefs untrustworthy when they were inconsistent with evolution, such as his conviction of the necessity of an intelligent First Cause and his “extreme difficulty” in conceiving the universe as the result of blind chance or necessity. However his theory was itself “a conviction of man’s mind” and therefore, following the same logic, was also untrustworthy. Darwin failed to recognize that to be logically consistent he needed to apply his doubts about the reliability of human reasoning to his theory on the origins of biodiversity. If he had done so he would have been confronted with an internal contradiction that undermines the reliability of all human beliefs, including the belief in evolution.

Relevant Modes of Inquiry

Hugh states that my first post “seems to exclude science from the debate, only to later revive it to provide the foundation for the kalām cosmological argument.” I find this comment rather odd for three reasons. Firstly, I mention the terms ‘science’, ‘scientific’, ‘empirical’, ‘empirically’ and ‘methodological naturalism’ a total of nine times before I even get to the kalām cosmological argument (KCA). Indeed, prior to advancing the KCA I address science in relation to metaphysical propositions, such as the proposition that a transcendent realm exists. Secondly, since Hugh perceives there to be an “absence of any evidence supporting supernaturalism” I would have thought he would be expecting little to no scientific evidence in my posts. Lastly, as I explain below, the point is trivial as scientific knowledge represents just one type of evidence relevant to the topic being debated.

Hugh then wonders why I state that “’Methodological naturalism restricts scientific enquiry to the study of natural causes and processes’, thus, ‘methods of enquiry into the existence of a supernatural reality are beyond the scope of empirical science’, and thus, ‘all propositions about ultimate reality will necessarily be philosophical’”. He suspects it is so I “can trade off the equality between the definitions of naturalism and supernaturalism”. However his suspicion is wide of the mark. I made these points to clarify the nature of the debate as Hugh appears to harbour the misconception that the epistemic status of philosophical naturalism is close to that of an empirically verifiable position, or that, at minimum, it has a higher epistemic status than supernaturalism has. Each of my points on the relationship between science and the investigation of ultimate reality can be readily confirmed as the establishment position on the topic. For instance, the US National Academy of Sciences in its official booklet Teaching about Evolution and the Nature of Science states:

“Because science is limited to explaining the natural world by means of natural processes, it cannot use supernatural causation in its explanations. Similarly, science is precluded from making statements about supernatural forces because these are outside its provenance.” (National Academy of Sciences, 1998)

Or in the words of Eugenie Scott, former executive director of the US National Center for Science Education:

“Science is a way of knowing that attempts to explain the natural world using natural causes. It is agnostic toward the supernatural – it neither confirms nor rejects it.” (Scott, 1999)

The restriction of scientific inquiry to natural causes mentioned in the foregoing quotes is known as methodological naturalism (MN), which is an epistemology and a procedural process that also acts as a set of demarcation criteria for differentiating science from non-science. As Wikipedia states:

“Methodological naturalism does not concern itself with claims about what exists, but with methods of learning what nature is. It attempts to explain and test scientific endeavors, hypotheses, and events with reference to natural causes and events.” (Wikipedia, ‘Naturalism (philosophy’)

Since MN a priori excludes claims about ultimately reality, the fact that Hugh broadly aligns his inherently metaphysical position on ultimately reality with MN is puzzling. I assume this is because he adheres to scientism – the belief that empirical science possesses a unique claim to knowledge, or all that can be known about the external world are things which can be determined through the methods of the natural sciences. Indeed, in a glossary of terms used on this blog Hugh defines naturalism as “the belief that the universe can be explained exclusively by natural laws and forces. There are no supernatural, or non-natural entities or causes, or if there are, they will be understandable in scientific, natural terms.”

My statement that “all propositions about ultimate reality will necessarily be philosophical” refers to the fact that naturalism and supernaturalism are properly the domain of metaphysics. This is cogently explained in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (1st Ed), which defines metaphysics as:

“Most generally, the philosophical investigation of the nature, constitution, and structure of reality. It is broader in scope than science, e.g., physics and even cosmology (the science of the nature, structure, and origin of the universe as a whole), since one of its traditional concerns is the existence of non-physical entities, e.g., God. It is also more fundamental, since it investigates questions science does not address but the answers to which it presupposes.” (Audi, 1995)

However, Hugh appears to misconstrue my statement as meaning philosophical arguments “sideline science altogether”. Clearly this is not the case as empirical evidence is crucial to many philosophical arguments, including the KCA. To restate a point I’ve made in previous replies, scientific evidence can support premises for a conclusion that has metaphysical significance, but a metaphysical position cannot ultimately be confirmed by scientific evidence alone (which would make it a scientific position). In other words, although one or more premises in individual arguments for supernaturalism and naturalism may be supported by empirical evidence, neither position as a whole is empirically verifiable.

Looking at it from the flipside may better illustrate this general distinction between scientific and philosophical propositions. There are many scientific theories – Einstein’s theory of general relativity and Newton’s theory of universal gravitation to cite just two – that are, arguably, based upon deeper philosophical premises, presuppositions and concepts which can be justified by philosophical lines of argument. However, we would not refer to these theories as philosophical propositions as they are derived from empirical observation and are amenable to direct or indirect experimental testing.

This convergence of philosophical and scientific evidence within the theories of general relativity and universal gravitation, and also within many propositions about ultimate reality, nicely illustrates Hugh’s point that “philosophy cannot exist in a bubble”. Far from been sidelined then, science plays a crucial role in many important philosophical propositions (and vice versa), including in many prominent arguments for and against the existence of a transcendent reality. And since the inclusion of both scientific and philosophical evidence often allows for a more complete and informative metaphysical argument, I wholeheartedly encourage Hugh to incorporate scientific evidence in his case for weak naturalism.

Hugh, however, goes too far when he implies that non-empirical propositions have “no regard for the real world”. While many arguments contain premises that are justified to varying degrees by empirical data, many others with ‘real world’ implications are justified purely on philosophical grounds. For example deductive arguments for God’s existence, including the Ontological Argument, the Moral Argument and Leibniz’ Contingency Argument, are purely philosophical arguments which provide evidence for the reality of a transcendent Creator. Moreover, Aquinas’ Five Ways are logical proofs that depend only minimally on inferences drawn from nature and are therefore not impacted by revisions to empirical knowledge. Further, while a posteriori knowledge is dependent on experience or empirical evidence, a priori knowledge is not and many non-empirical propositions based on a priori knowledge have practical real-world applications.

To quote from Wikipedia again:

A priori knowledge or justification is independent of experience, as with mathematics (3,000 + 2,000 = 5,000), tautologies (“All bachelors are unmarried”), and deduction from pure reason (eg, ontological proofs).” (Wikipedia: ‘A priori and a posteriori’)

Hugh asserts “Virtually all scientists operate under the assumption of philosophical naturalism – all causes are empirical and naturalistic ones which can be measured, quantified and studied methodically.” I suspect, it would be more accurate to say that most scientists, including those who are theists, adopt methodological naturalism (rather than philosophical naturalism) while conducting scientific research into physical phenomena, but not necessarily when investigating immaterial realities not associated with physical causality or not reducible to the actions of neurons, subatomic particles, physical forces, etc. Such realities are beyond reductionist science and include human appreciation of beauty, art, music, poetry, literature, and other creative activities involving abstract thought, as well as conceptions of aesthetics, justice, morality, honour, mercy and love.

But even when addressing the physical world empirical inquiry has its limitations, thereby requiring us to go beyond the senses and natural sciences to attain a more complete understanding of the universe. The reason why empirical science cannot give us a complete description of reality is that it is, by its nature, quantitative. Although the quantitative methods of modern science have resulted in many spectacular predictive and technological successes, they can only capture those aspects of reality amenable to mathematical modeling, prediction and control. It certainly does not follow that there are no other aspects of reality.

It should also be noted that although many scientists adhere to methodological naturalism while studying the causes or properties of physical phenomena, that does not necessarily mean they are philosophical naturalists or believe the natural sciences alone reveal all they can know about the world. After all, modern science was largely founded by theists like Newton, Galileo, Kepler, Leibniz, Copernicus, Boyle and others who believed that order and precision exhibited by the physical universe, and the overall intelligibility of the natural world, revealed evidence of God’s existence. But irrespective of one’s worldview, science is about following the evidence wherever it leads and evaluating evidence entirely on its merits – not filtering it through the lens of a particular philosophical position or judging its validity on its congruence with specific metaphysical preconceptions.

Kalām Cosmological Argument

Hugh contends the kalām cosmological argument commits the fallacy of composition by “moving from the contingency of the components of the universe, to the contingency of the universe”. However, the KCA does not argue compositionally – that because everything within the universe has a cause, therefore the universe as a whole has a cause. Rather, it is based on the Causal Principle – everything that comes into existence at some point must have a cause which brings it into existence, and the scientific consensus that the universe began to exist. Additionally, the Causal Principle, which is constantly confirmed in our experience, is an inductive generalisation – not a statement about one thing, and therefore cannot be the result of an inference from the parts of a thing to the whole. In other words, it is drawing an inference about all the members of a class of things based on a sample of the class. Inductive reasoning undergirds empirical science and is not to be confused with reasoning by composition.

Further, not every inference from part to whole commits a fallacy of composition; whether an inference does so depends on the subject matter. If each brick in a wall of Lego bricks is red, it does follow that the wall as a whole is red. Even if one were to infer from the contingency of the parts of the universe to that of the whole universe, I contend that would be more like the inference to the colour of the Lego wall (or to the colour of the Great Wall of China) than the inference to its size.

Philosopher Edward Feser explains it this way:

If A and B are of the same length, putting them side by side is going to give us a whole with a length different from those of A and B themselves. That just follows from the nature of length. If A and B are of the same color, putting them side by side is not going to give us a whole with a color different from those of A and B themselves. That just follows from the nature of color. If A and B are both contingent, does putting them together give us something that is necessary? It is hard to see how; indeed, anyone willing to concede that Lego bricks, tables, chairs, rocks, trees, and the like are individually contingent is surely going to concede that any arbitrary group of these things is no less contingent. And why should the inference to the contingency of such collections stop when we get to the universe as a whole? It seems a natural extension of the reasoning, and the burden of proof is surely on the critic of such an argument to show that the universe as a whole is somehow non-contingent, given that the parts, and collections of parts smaller than the universe as a whole, are contingent. (Feser, 2010)

Ultimately though, since the KCA is not justified by an argument from composition Hugh is simply arguing against a straw man here.

Hugh claims the KCA’s conclusion that the universe began to exist is invalid because “given that space and time are inextricably linked, the contention that the universe began suggests a moment preceding its existence. But, as Stephen Hawking has pointed out, this is like seeking a point more northerly than the North Pole – the universe can be both finite and without a prior moment or beginning.”

Firstly, the view that the universe had an absolute beginning and there was no space, time, matter, energy and, hence, physical laws before the universe began is the consensus view of physicists and cosmologists for good reason. The standard Big Bang model, which posits space, time, matter and energy came into existence at a single point simultaneously, is well supported by a confluence of independent lines of inquiry. Prominent US sceptic Michael Shermer briefly explains why the theory is so well supported in the April 2017 issue of Scientific American:

“There are many propositions for which we have adequate grounds for certainty as to their truth: There are 84 pages in this issue of Scientific American. True by observation. Dinosaurs went extinct around 65 million years ago. True by verification and replication of radiometric dating techniques for volcanic eruptions above and below dinosaur fossils. The universe began with a big bang. True by a convergence of evidence from a wide range of phenomena, such as the cosmic microwave background, the abundance of light elements (such as hydrogen and helium), the distribution of galaxies, the large-scale structure of the cosmos, the redshift of most galaxies and the expansion of space. These propositions are “true” in the sense that the evidence is so substantial that it would be unreasonable to withhold one’s provisional assent.” (Shermer, 2017)

Theoretical physicist and cosmologist Alexander Vilenkin, along with Arvin Borde and Alan Guth, was able to prove that any universe that has on average been expanding throughout its history cannot be infinite in the past but must have a past space-time boundary. The Borde-Guth-Vilenkin singularity theorem shows that classical space-time, under a single, very general condition, cannot be extended to past infinity but must reach a boundary at some time in the finite past. Vilenkin states:

“It is said that an argument is what convinces reasonable men and a proof is what it takes to convince even an unreasonable man. With the proof now in place, cosmologists can no longer hide behind the possibility of a past-eternal universe. There is no escape, they have to face the problem of a cosmic beginning.” (Vilenkin, 2006)

Or, as a New Scientist editorial plainly states after examining research disconfirming models of the universe designed to avoid the need for a creation event: “It now seems certain that the universe did have a beginning.” (Editorial, 2012)

Secondly, nearly all space-time theorems derived from general relativity establish a singular simultaneous beginning for all the matter, energy, space and time in the universe rather than suggest a moment of time preceding the universe’s existence. Indeed, there is no justification for the assumption that causal priority implies temporal priority. As philosopher William Lane Craig comments:

“The standard Big Bang model thus describes a universe which is not eternal in the past, but which came into being a finite time ago. Moreover—and this deserves underscoring—the origin it posits is an absolute origin ex nihilo. For not only all matter and energy, but space and time themselves come into being at the initial cosmological singularity. As Barrow and Tipler emphasize, “At this singularity, space and time came into existence; literally nothing existed before the singularity, so, if the Universe originated at such a singularity, we would truly have a creation ex nihilo“. (Craig, 1999)

And lastly, Stephen Hawking’s model for a finite universe “without a prior moment or beginning” is a speculative proposal that employs a statistical technique (imaginary numbers) for time variables in order to preserve a purely spatial representation of the beginning of the universe. The problem with the use of imaginary numbers in the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary quantum cosmology model is aptly explained by William Lane Craig:

“The question which arises for this construal of the model is whether such an interpretation is meant to be taken realistically or instrumentally. On this score, there can be little doubt that the use of imaginary quantities for time is a mere mathematical device without ontological significance. [English cosmologist, theoretical physicist and mathematician David] Barrow observes, ‘physicists have often carried out this “change time into space” procedure as a useful trick for doing certain problems in ordinary quantum mechanics, although they did not imagine that time was really like space. At the end of the calculation, they just swap back into the usual interpretation of there being one dimension of time and three . . . dimensions of . . . space.’ In his model, Hawking simply declines to re-convert to real numbers. If we do, then the singularity re-appears. Hawking admits, ‘Only if we could picture the universe in terms of imaginary time would there be no singularities… When one goes back to the real time in which we live, however, there will still appear to be singularities.’ Hawking’s model is thus a way of re-describing a universe with a singular beginning point in such a way that that singularity is transformed away; but such a re-description is not realist in character.

Hawking has recently stated explicitly that he interprets the Hartle-Hawking model non-realistically. He confesses, ‘I’m a positivist … I don’t demand that a theory correspond to reality because I don’t know what it is.’ Still more extreme, ‘I take the positivist viewpoint that a physical theory is just a mathematical model and that it is meaningless to ask whether it corresponds to reality.’ In assessing the worth of a theory, ‘All I’m concerned with is that the theory should predict the results of measurements.’ ’ (Craig, 1999)

Given the foregoing, Hawking’s logical impossibility of multiple most-northerly points fails as a defeater for the claim that the universe had a beginning. It would be more accurate to employ Hawking’s logical impossibility as an analogy in the following way: Before the Big Bang time did not exist, therefore one cannot go further back in time than the Big Bang in much the same way one cannot go any further north than the North Pole.

Hugh informs us that philosopher of science Adolf Grünbaum “explains that the singularity of the Big Bang does not conform to an actual ‘physical event’ given its unbounded nature, infinite density and scalar curvature. Thus, it does not even have the requisite chrono-geometric relations specified by the space-time metric, to which a cause could be applied – it cannot in fact ‘be the effect of event-causation or agent-causation alike’” (Grünbaum, 1994)

Grünbaum’s comments are from his critique of the Philosophia Naturalis article “Creation and Big Bang Cosmology” by philosopher William Lane Craig (Craig, 1994a). Craig subsequently responded to Grünbaum’s objections (Craig, 1994b) and in response to Grünbaum’s claim that the Big Bang singularity was not a physical event, Craig notes:

“Grünbaum’s lengthy critique is actually directed at only two paragraphs of my original article (the fourth and the fifth). In the first of these I charge that Grünbaum’s objection that the Big Bang singularity cannot have been caused (because it could have had neither a subsequent cause nor an antecedent cause) is a pseudo-dilemma because the cause of the initial cosmological singularity could be simultaneous (or coincident) with that singularity. In response, Grünbaum presents the following argument:

1. Only events can qualify as the momentary effects of other events or of the action of an agency.
2. The Big Bang singularity is technically a non-event.
3. Therefore, the singularity cannot be the effect of any cause in the case of event causation or agent causation.

If this argument is sound, then it is simply irrelevant whether the putative cause of the Big Bang singularity is antecedent to, simultaneous with, or subsequent to the singularity, since any sort of cause of the singularity is excluded.

It seems to me, however, that this argument is invalid, since it equivocates on the meaning of the term “event.” The sense in which the initial cosmological singularity is not an event is, as Grünbaum notes, a technical sense employed in GTR [General Theory of Relativity]. Since that singular point is not Hausdorff isolated, that is to say, since its coordinates cannot be specified independently of all other space-time points, it cannot be classed as an event as that term is technically used in GTR. But the word “event” as it is used in (1) cannot be this terminus technicus if (1) is to be plausibly regarded as true. For we can easily envision happenings which are not “events” in the technical sense in which that word is used in GTR, but which do qualify as the momentary effects of other events or agent causes: (i) The initial cosmological singularity is causally linked to later space-time points and events, so that in this case we have events which are the momentary effects of a non-event. Now consider the final cosmological singularity in a universe caught in gravitational self-collapse: here we have a case in which a non-event is the momentary effect of other events, which contradicts (1), if that premiss uses “event” in the technical sense at issue. (ii) In the quantum realm, occurrences take place (such as the collision of two elementary particles) which cannot be termed “events” in GTR’s technical sense. Classical conceptions of space and time finally break down within the quantum regime. Yet these quantum occurrences are doubtlessly causally conditioned by macroscopic physical states which are classifiable as (series of) events (such as a quantum experiment’s being carried out by a researcher). (iii) The technical sense of “event” in GTR is inapplicable to mental events such as the perception of an object or the experience of being surprised. Yet such occurrences in consciousness are clearly in part the momentary effects of events in the physical world and also, plausibly, of the action of agents, as, say, when I force myself to concentrate on some subject or to get my mind off something else. (iv) If God exists, why could He not cause momentary effects which are not events in the GTR sense of the word? Could He not create a universe not governed by GTR in which there are momentary effects of His action which are not “events” in the technical sense of the term? Since GTR is not metaphysically necessary, why is this impossible? And why could not mental processes, quantum occurrences, and singularities be causally produced by God? In short, (1) is plausibly true only if “event” is understood in a broader, non-technical sense (for example, “that which happens”) than the sense which that term carries in GTR. But in that case (3) does not follow from (1) and (2), since the notion of “event” in these two premisses is not univocal.” (Craig, 1994b)

Hugh asserts, “the laws of conservation do not suggest that we can keep on subtracting elements from the universe until we get nothing. Parmenides famous adage, ‘from nothing, nothing comes’, does not suggest that nothing preceded something and that something needs a cause. Rather, it expresses the riddle of existence itself. There is no reduction of something into nothing in the natural world. And so, the state of nothing which is supposed to precede something, is doubtful at best, and antithetical to our observations of the natural world at worst.”

Hugh’s position requires that there is at least one natural entity that was either uncaused or self-caused. However, there are a number of problems with this position. If the proposed entity had no antecedent cause it would be self-existing and past-eternal. Yet it would not be part of nature because the natural world (which of course includes the laws of conservation) had a beginning point in the finite past (a singularity) and, therefore, a past-eternal entity would transcend nature. Nor could the entity be self-caused as the notion of self-causation is a logical impossibility – no entity can cause its own existence because no entity can cause anything unless it already exists. This effectively rules out Hugh’s proposition of “a timeless natural force which governs all of existence”, but certainly allows for a timeless supernatural force which governs everything.

Brute Facts

Hugh claims, “the cosmological argument assumes the universe itself cannot be a brute fact (or eternal) because everything that begins must have a cause; and then goes on to suggest that therefore there must be a brute fact (such as God) to explain it. This is begging the question. One cannot logically deny the existence of brute facts as a premise (whatever begins to exist has a cause) and then insert a brute fact as the conclusion (a necessary, uncaused being).” However, the KCA makes no such assumption. As I’ve stated above, the argument simply draws a logical conclusion from premises based on (1) the Causal Principle that everything that comes into existence has a cause which brings it into existence, and (2) the scientific consensus that the universe began to exist. (Why assume the existence of something is a brute fact when the available evidence explains aspects of its existence?) Besides, while the KCA appeals to philosophical and scientific evidence to argue that the universe had a cause of its existence, it neither concludes that this cause is God or a brute fact, nor denies the existence of brute facts. Arguments that expand on the KCA, such as arguments B and C in my first post, may deduce certain properties of the universe’s cause, such as that it is supernatural, however, they do so based on valid deductive arguments. Even if one concludes that the supernatural cause of the universe is God (as I do), one is not appealing to a brute fact. As philosopher Karlo Broussard explains:

“The theist is not saying God is a brute fact, i.e., he has no reason or explanation for His existence. It is essential to classical theism that God’s existence, though not caused by another, is explained by his essence. His essence is existence itself—ipsum esse subsistens. This is not something theists arbitrarily assert but is the conclusion of deductive reasoning that starts with certain features of the world—motion (change), efficient causality, contingency, degrees of being, and final causality.” (Broussard, 2016)

Hugh says, “One can simply ask why can’t the universe, or an element within it, be the brute fact?” To borrow again from William Lane Craig,

“Although the brute fact claim for the universe’s existence would have some credibility if the universe is past-eternal, it loses all credibility once we discover that the universe began to exist, for then we are forced to say that for no reason whatsoever the universe popped into being out of absolutely nothing, which is worse than magic.” (Craig, 2017)

Please note: Given the breadth of topics covered in this response, I’ll discuss teleological arguments in a future post.

 

SOURCES

Audi, R [Ed] (1995)  The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Barlow, N [Ed] (1958) The Autobiography of Charles Darwin 1809–1882. Collins, London.

Broussard, K (2016) ‘5 reasons why the universe can’t be merely a brute fact’, StrangeNotions.com.

Craig, WL (1994a) ‘Creation and Big Bang Cosmology’ Philosophia Naturalis 31(2): 217-224.

Craig, WL (1994b) ‘A Response to Grünbaum on Creation and Big Bang Cosmology’, Philosophia Naturalis 31(2): 237-249.

Craig, WL (1999) ‘The ultimate question of origins: God and the beginning of the universe’, Astrophysics and Space Science 269-270: p.237-249.

Craig, WL (2017) ‘Royally Bad Objections to the Kalām Cosmological ArgumentReasonableFaith.org. 29 Jan 2017.

Editorial (2012) ‘The Genesis problem’ New Scientist (2847) 14 Jan 2012.

Feser, E (2010) ‘Hume, cosmological arguments, and the fallacy of compositionEdwardFeser.blogspot.com 28 Dec 2010.

Gordon, BL (2011) ‘The rise of naturalism and its problematic role in science and culture’, in Gordon, BL and Dembski, WA (Eds) The Nature of Nature: Examining the Role of Naturalism in Science. Intercollegiate Studies Institute, Delaware.

Grossman, L (2012) ‘Why physicists can’t avoid a creation event’, New Scientist (2487) 14 Jan 2012.

Grünbaum, A (1994) ‘Some Comments on William Craig’s “Creation and Big Bang Cosmology”’, Philosophia Naturalis 31(2): 225-236.

Mastin, L (Undated) ‘Time and the Big Bang’ ExactlyWhatIsTime.com

National Academy of Sciences (1998) Teaching About Evolution and the Nature of Science. National Academy Press, Washington DC: p.124

Scott, EC (1999) “The ‘Science and Religion’ Movement. An Opportunity for Improved Public Understanding of Science?Skeptical Inquirer 23(4): 29-31

Shermer, M (2017) “What would it take to prove the resurrection?Scientific American 316(4).

Vilenkin, A (2006) Many Worlds in One: The Search for Other Universes. Hill and Wang, New York. p.176.

phantomachristmascarol

Warning Scripture replaced by new type of Theism

Published on The AIM Network – Warning Scripture replaced by new type of Theism – 20 April 2017

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peopledontwanttohear the truth

Placating the Reverend Fred Nile and the various religious lobbies is no easy task, but the NSW Government has taken to it with Yes Minister style obtuseness and Baldrick-like cunning. Maintaining its cuddly relationship with Scripture enthusiasts, the government has spent $300k on a comprehensive report, waited 18 months to release it (just before Easter), and then refused to accept most of the recommendations.

Particularly brazen, was both the refusal to include Ethics on the enrolment form, and continuing to prevent non-participating students from proceeding with curriculum learning while Scripture was conducted. Both, the NSW Secondary Principals’ Council, and the NSW P & C Federation expressed disappointment and mystification at this outcome.

So, in the wake of this ongoing debacle – and like the phantom from Charles Dickens, A Christmas Carol – I’d like to offer the advocates of Scripture a disturbing glimpse into Australia’s atheistic yet-to-come. Christianity is in freefall in Australia: the 2016 Census result will show non-belief overtaking Catholicism as the most popular category. Soon, classes in Secular Humanism and Rationalism will appear in Victorian schools as part of “Learning about world views and religions”. Although these classes will be educational rather than evangelical, it’s not hard to imagine an increasingly irreligious society acquiescing to a more muscular approach to teaching nonreligious worldviews.

Imagine the following inverse scenario: State governments have become beholden to irreligious lobby groups, demanding to protect their freedom to promote their naturalistic belief systems. Perhaps we even have an antitheist holding the balance of power.

And now that the metaphysical wheel has come full circle, we atheists will band together, gather up our copies of “God is not Great – Religion Poisons Everything” by Christopher Hitchens, and begin offering evangelical classes in a new type of Theism. Yes – Antitheism! Just like Scripture, classes will be deceptively marketed as “educational”, and a benign “introduction”, but in practice they will be all-out, Hitchens-like assaults on religion, aimed at ridding children, once and for all, of the human susceptibility and credulity towards the supernatural.

After enduring a century or so of state school Bible-bashing, it’s about time. We have developed a non-believer’s version of the Lausanne movement – the Christian group committed to entreating children into fellowship with Jesus, based on research showing that if they don’t embrace the Lord before the age of 13 they likely never will. Our secular version will scare the bejesus and Jesus out of young children, warning them off celestial tyrants for life.

You’re not a teacher? Don’t worry, we’ll give you the Antitheism crash course, some angry YouTube videos, and a sober pep talk on the importance of brainwashing other people’s children.

We’ve had plenty of time to plan the rise of evangelical antitheism. While Scripture classes segregated us from our friends and frittered away hours of our childhood, we were in the other room, brooding quietly– imagine Damien from Damien the Omen – and secretly plotting revenge.

We envisaged the sort of spine-tingling, dystopian future that would chill the blood of any good Scripture teacher. Same-sex marriage is law. Evidence-based laws and regulations with appropriate limitations allow abortion, euthanasia and stem cell research. And with religious exemptions removed from anti-discrimination law, no-one has to lie about their sexuality or pretend to believe in ancient myths to secure employment.

Finally, in state schools, Bible classes have made way for supercharged Antitheism, administered with the same deceptive policies which currently fail to regulate Scripture. Who approves and vets lesson content? No-one.

Parents who fail to be vigilant enough to opt their children out, will find them automatically enrolled into Antitheism. And – accidents will happen – even devout children will suddenly find themselves being told matter-of-factly that there is no God. There’s no heaven or hell either, kids. And by the way, we disapprove of your superstitious parents.

Kids will be Hitch-slapped with the absurdity of the Christian idea that our lives are governed by a God so powerful, he created an unfathomably vast universe with trillions of planets; and yet, is such an inveterate gossip and all-knowing busybody, that he insists on listening to the prayers of every single person on the planet.

Supplanting current day Scripture classes presenting the Bible as “factual” and “historical”, our classes will pillory the “good” book as a litany of fables and comical morality tales. No kids, people did not reside inside of whales, joyride upon Dinosaurs, nor live for 600 years before deciding to have children. Koala’s did not wave goodbye to Noah and leap from tree to tree all the way to Australia without leaving any trace anywhere else.

Morality cannot be derived from myths. Anthropology has shown that Adam and Eve did not exist, thus original sin is bunk. Prohibitions against murder appeared in civilisations predating Christianity and Judaism, well before the supposed Mt. Sinai summit of Moses and God.

That will bring us to the end of term, and our “God is dead” Sombrero party, climaxing spectacularly with the smashing of a lolly-filled Pinyata of Christ the Redeemer.

But we won’t repeat some of the more desperate Christian SRE classes, such as those encouraging instructors to bring in dead animals to dissect, simulating beheadings, age-inappropriate vampire lessons, comparing kids to dirty towels in need of cleansing, and threatening young children or their parents with death.

Nonetheless, Scripture advocates might justifiably recoil from this dread atheistic future. But this future is not inevitable. Take it as a warning of what’s in store unless we change our ways. Perhaps, after all, there is something to be said for a non-discriminatory and comparative approach to teaching religion in state schools. And perhaps, hopefully, the idea of obtruding unverifiable beliefs onto children may seem a little less appealing.

resurrection

Did you remember secular values this Easter?

Christoncross

An earlier version of this article published in Rendezview The Daily Telegraph 17/04/17 – Christianity no longer a central part of Australian life

 

Last week, in the Courier Mail, Dr Kevin Donnelly felt the need to remind us that celebrating Easter proves the influence of the Bible.

Having taken off the bunny ears and coaxed our chocolate-filled bellies off the couch, most Australians observe the unfastening and remoteness of family Easter festivities from the biblical story of a risen Christ.

And, if Easter really did prove the importance of the Bible, why would we need reminding?

Because, it’s not due to short term memory loss that 9 out of 10 Australians no longer attend church regularly. Nor is sudden memory-failure the reason non-belief will soon overtake Catholicism to become Australia’s largest religious affiliation.

Quite simply, the Christian church is no longer a central part of Australian life, and gentle reminders will be insufficient to revive it.

Increasingly unmoored from religious rituals, it’s worth noting that Easter – a word derived from Eastra, the goddess of spring – was originally a celebration of the spring equinox, with the date determined by the cycles of the moon.

Resurrection and rebirth myths go back as far as recorded history. Cuneiform tablets from 2100 B.C document the resurrection of Ianno, who was judged and killed in the underworld, raised from the dead after three days and restoring fertility to the earth.

And that’s not denying the importance of the Bible in understanding western civilisation. Without it, it’s difficult to comprehend how we got here. Since Constantine adopted Christianity in the 4th century, it has been integral to the character and fabric of western civilization.

But acknowledging our history, does not imply that we should deny the pluralism and diversity of our current society, nor make us intransigent against change. Further, one cannot help but detect a “culture war” theme motivating Donnelly’s argument.

Why for instance does he quote Professor Higgins, from My Fair Lady, saying that English is the language of “Milton, Shakespeare and the Bible”?

The Bible was written in Aramaic, and Jesus was a Palestinian. The Bible was finally translated to English by Protestant reformer William Tyndale in the 16th century amidst theological outrage. The original translations were burned, and Tyndale was finally rewarded for his efforts by strangulation and burning at the stake.

Western civilisation began long before the supposed virgin-birth of Jesus. Rather than being founded upon the New Testament, western culture integrated Christianity into a milieu of Jewish wisdom, Greek philosophy and Roman law.

Again, I would not wish to understate the value of the Bible as part of western literature, but it is a prism through which we understand the past, rather than a light that guides the way in the future.

The recent furore over Coopers Brewing and their support for the Bible Society over same sex marriage, demonstrates the increasing chasm between biblical beliefs and modern secular values.

The idea that our society is somehow held together by the teachings of Jesus, is decisively undermined by the Enlightenment – the secular project, which finally wrested control of government and science from the church.

Finally, secular values allowed different sects and different religions to coexist without endless conflict. The era of science conforming to theology was over, and progress was thereafter swift.

Moreover, the Ten Commandments retain little influence on the modern Australian legal system or indeed modern ethics. Nor were they particularly innovative moral teachings in their time. Surely, it wasn’t the meeting of Moses and God for 40 days and nights on Mt Sinai, which convinced humanity that murder was inadvisable. The prohibition on murder, along with other values such as the golden rule, all appear in the civilisations of India, China, Athens and Rome, predating Christianity by thousands of years.

Raising his Bible to ward off Islamic terrorism, like a crucifix to a vampire, Donnelly suggests the antidote to religious violence is yet more religion. But promoting conformity to Christian teachings will only infuriate and isolate those from other cultural traditions. What we need is a broadening of cultural tolerance, not a narrowing.

What we should remember at holiday times is the things which unite us, not those which divide. Namely, the Enlightenment values of tolerance, secularism, freedom of thought, the rule of law, and democracy. If we owe a debt to Christianity, it’s because of the excesses and dogmas which necessitated modern secular values.

EarthfromSpace

In defence of weak naturalism – Post 2: a response to Gary Robertson

In defence of weak naturalism – Post 2: a response to Gary Robertson’s Is Naturalism more probable than Supernaturalism?

by Hugh Harris

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The position I propose to defend is weak naturalism. Conforming broadly to the standard of scientific inquiry known as methodological naturalism, it can be distinguished from the stronger position of philosophical naturalism, which claims categorically that the natural world is all there is.

Weak naturalism: as far as we know, the natural world is all there is. I defend the claim that naturalism is more probable than supernaturalism, in my essay Naturalism versus Supernaturalism- the false dichotomy – I argue that the observance of the natural world along with its laws combined with the absence of any evidence of the supernatural, amounts to a strong prima facie case for naturalism, and its likelihood in comparison to the sans-evidence claims of supernaturalism.

In his first post, Is Naturalism more probable than Supernaturalism?, Gary Robertson seems to exclude science from the debate, only to later revive it to provide the foundation for the kalam cosmological argument. Gary states that “Methodological naturalism restricts scientific enquiry to the study of natural causes and processes”, thus, “methods of enquiry into the existence of a supernatural reality are beyond the scope of empirical science”, and thus, “all propositions about ultimate reality will necessarily be philosophical”. I’m not sure why Gary does this, but I suspect that it’s so he can trade off the equality between the definitions of naturalism and supernaturalism . Perhaps philosophically they are equal inversions, in the sense that naturalism is the denial of the supernatural and the supernatural is the affirmation of it. But evidentially, they are not equal.

Virtually all scientists operate under the assumption of philosophical naturalism – all causes are empirical and naturalistic ones which can be measured, quantified and studied methodically. When our children are ill, we don’t look for magicians or witch doctors summoning supernatural forces. Why? Because there is no evidence they work, and much evidence suggesting they’re harmful. And this is despite the plethora of religious faith healers such as the discredited John of God faith healer, who scratches at the eyes of the credulous and who has made over $10 million out of selling crystals and other fake cures, and yet, had his own cancer treated by chemotherapy in a hospital.

And so Gary might have to forgive my reluctance to sideline science altogether from this debate. Additionally, I assume we’d agree that philosophy cannot exist in its own bubble, separated from empiricism, with no regard for the real world. Ontological naturalism is indeed a philosophical position, but as a study of the ultimate nature of reality it cannot be simply hived out and segregated from science. Further, the ultimate nature of reality is unlikely to vary depending on what University faculty building one happens to be in.

Evidently Gary agrees, given he goes on to claim that “supernatural causation logically follows from empirical evidence in the field of cosmology that strongly suggests the universe had a beginning and that nature…did not exist prior to the universe coming into being. Thus, … the universe transcended nature and was, therefore, supernatural”.

But I disagree that that’s what the scientific/empirical evidence suggests, as indeed do the majority of philosophers and scientists. The kalam cosmological argument:

 

Whatever begins to exist has a cause.

The Universe began to exist.

Therefore, the Universe had a cause

 

Objecting to my previous critique, Gary issues the following challenge: “I would certainly be keen to know how the deductive arguments formulated above equate to “conflating the process of coming to an invalid conclusion using empirical evidence rather than simply observing the empirical evidence itself””.

The cosmological argument uses the causality, we observe in the known world to make the case that the known world itself must have a cause. But this self-referentially uses the laws of causality, to explain their own existence. Bertrand Russell exposes that moving from the contingency of the components of the universe, to the contingency of the universe, commits the Fallacy of Composition, which mistakenly concludes that since the parts have a certain property, the whole likewise has that property. If all bricks in a wall are small, is the Great Wall of China small?

The kalam cosmological argument makes the invalid assumption the universe began to exist. Given that space and time are inextricably linked, the contention that the universe began suggests a moment preceding its existence. But, as Stephen Hawking has pointed out, this is like seeking a point more northerly than the North Pole – the universe can be both finite and without a prior moment or beginning.

Adolf Grunbaum 1994, explains that the singularity of the Big Bang does not conform to an actual “physical event” given its unbounded nature, infinite density and scalar curvature. Thus, it does not even have the requisite chrono-geometric relations specified by the space-time metric, to which a cause could be applied – it cannot in fact “be the effect of event-causation or agent-causation alike”.

Additionally, the laws of conservation do not suggest that we can keep on subtracting elements from the universe until we get nothing. Parmenides famous adage, “from nothing, nothing comes”, does not suggest that nothing preceded something and that something needs a cause. Rather, it expresses the riddle of existence itself. There is no reduction of something into nothing in the natural world. And so, the state of nothing which is supposed to precede something, is doubtful at best, and antithetical to our observations of the natural world at worst.

Grunbaum 1994, further argues that “a galaxy of theists… take it to be axiomatic that if there is a physical world at all, then its spontaneous, undisturbed or natural state is one of utter nothingness, whatever that is… Why, in the absence of an external supernatural cause, should there be just nothing?” Further, the “presupposition of the spontaneity of nothingness lacks even the most rudimentary plausibility”. Many philosophers have argued against the proposition of nothingness as unintelligible. Why assume nothingness as a default, or a brute fact?

The other consideration, is that the cosmological argument assumes the universe itself cannot be a brute fact (or eternal) because everything that begins must have a cause; and then goes on to suggest that therefore there must be a brute fact (such as God) to explain it. This is begging the question. One cannot logically deny the existence of brute facts as a premise (whatever begins to exist has a cause) and then insert a brute fact as the conclusion (a necessary, uncaused being). One can simply ask why can’t the universe, or an element within it, be the brute fact. Crucially, even if one accepts that the universe begins, why cannot it not begin due to a timeless natural force which governs all of existence?

Thus, it’s invalid to suggest that the evidence points to a supernatural cause of the universe. In regards to teleological arguments we’ll have to discuss the specific versions. Then, my generalisations on this subject – “arguments from incredulity” – can be supported by considering the particular teleological argument in question.